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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Florida Legislature saw a serious lobbying effort
aimed at securing the enactment of wholesale revisions to Florida’s
civil justice system. These reforms, if enacted, would substantially
dilute important doctrines such as Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine, provide more defenses to escape liability, and create
higher hurdles before plaintiffs can receive certain types of damages.
Championed by the business community, the reforms would limit defendants’ liability at the cost of putting the safety of Florida’s citizens at risk.
Part II of this Article examines both the historical and political
environment that led to this effort. Part III analyzes the motivating
factors behind the push for reform. Part IV addresses the proposals
for reform, while Part V discusses what has happened since the end
of the 1997 session. Part VI examines whether there truly is a need
for tort reform. Part VII concludes that the battle over tort reform
will surely continue into the 1998 legislative session.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the ongoing ebb and flow of the legislative process, every session sees a handful of “tort reform” bills aimed like rifle shots at
* Sole Practitioner, Tallahassee, Florida. The author has served as a lobbyist and
as Special Legislative Counsel to the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Tallahassee,
Florida, since 1987. B.S., Florida State University, 1970; J.D., Florida State University,
1975. The author formerly served as a staff attorney with the Florida House of Representatives from 1975 to 1986 and, in his capacity as staff counsel to the Florida House of Representatives Committee on Health Care and Insurance, participated in the development of
the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985 and the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986.
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smaller, specific issues.1 These bills typically reduce or eliminate liability in a particular circumstance that has been the subject of a
particular court decision. On a few occasions, efforts at comprehensive liability-reducing “reform” packages resulted in fundamental
changes to Florida’s tort law.
Like many other states, Florida experienced a tumultuous period
of intensive legislative tort reform activity in the mid-1980s, especially in the areas of medical malpractice and the civil justice system.2 These efforts were followed by similarly sweeping reforms in
the workers’ compensation area from 1989 to 1993. 3 Each reform effort was precipitated by a real or perceived insurance availability
and/or affordability “crisis” that tort reform advocates pointed to as
justification for their proposed restrictions on individual liberties. 4 In
retrospect, however, these “crises” were at least arguably precipitated by the business practices of the insurance industry rather than
abuses in the tort system.5
In the mid 1980s, medical malpractice was the first area to receive legislative attention. In response to a perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis, the 1985 Legislature attempted to offer relief in what was known as the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice
Reform Act of 1985 (1985 Act).6 Before the ink dried on the 1985 Act,
the Legislature enacted the much more comprehensive Tort Reform
and Insurance Act of 1986 (1986 Act).7 The 1986 Act was conceived
1. See, e.g., Fla. HB 415 (1997), Fla. SB 1472 (1997) (protecting directors of funeral
processions from liability resulting from accidents); Fla. SB 1052 (1997), Fla. HB 1949
(1997) (exempting public schools from liability for injuries arising out of public non-school
use of the facilities); Fla. SB 1256 (1997), Fla. HB 855 (1997) (limiting the liability of private schools for injuries to students during non-school activities); Fla. SB 1778 (1997), Fla.
HB 1691 (1997), Fla. HB 2117 (1997) (shielding car rental companies from vicarious liability); Fla. SB 2166 (1997) (limiting the medical malpractice liability of health care practitioners); Fla. SB 766 (1997), Fla. SB 1658 (1997), Fla. HB 1673 (1997) (limiting the medical malpractice liability of private teaching hospitals); Fla. SB 1264 (1997), Fla. HB 589
(1997) (limiting the liability of nursing homes for violation of their residents’ rights).
2. See, e.g., Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985, ch. 85-175,
1985 Fla. Laws 1180 (amending and codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.); Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695 (amending and codified in
scattered sections of FLA. STAT.); Florida Medical Incident Recovery Act of 1988, ch. 88-1,
1988 Fla. Laws 119 (amending and codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.).
3. See, e.g., Act effective July 5, 1989, ch. 89-289, 1989 Fla. Laws 1743 (amending
and codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.); Act effective June 26, 1990, ch. 90-201,
1990 Fla. Laws 894 (amending and codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.); Act effective Jan. 24, 1991, ch. 91-1, 1991 Fla. Laws 21 (amending and codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.); Act effective Jan. 1, 1994, ch. 93-415, 1994 Fla. Laws 62 (amending
and codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.).
4. See, e.g., Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695,
698 (amending and codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.).
5. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, The Causes of the Insurance Crisis, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY 54 (1988).
6. Ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180.
7. Ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695.
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as an effort to relieve the general liability insurance affordability
and availability “crisis” perceived to exist throughout much of the
business community.8 The 1986 Act, which gained national recognition for its far-reaching tort reforms, superseded and supplemented
many of the provisions adopted specifically for medical malpractice
in 1985.9 Additionally, it made fundamental changes to the general
tort law, including nearly eliminating joint and several liability,
placing caps on noneconomic and punitive damages, and imposing
requirements for periodic payments and collateral source offsets.10
This was a major shift in the Florida civil justice system. Virtually every one of these changes was designed to decrease defendants’
exposure to liability at the expense of injured plaintiffs. Theoretically, this shift in the system’s balance would reduce liability insurance costs and alleviate the insurance availability problems. 11 However, the Legislature was not willing to rely upon the liability insurance industry to voluntarily put theory into practice. Instead, it
threw into the mix extensive new insurance rate regulation provi8. One example of the insurance “crisis” of the time was the alleged inability of day
care centers to obtain liability insurance.
9. Compare ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, with ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695.
10. See ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695. The 1986 Act virtually abolished the doctrine
of joint and several liability for cases where the damages exceed $25,000. See FLA. STAT. §
768.81(5) (1997). Under the hybrid scheme included in the 1986 Act, the doctrine of joint
and several liability is to be applied only to a defendant’s liability for economic damages
and only in circumstances where the defendant’s fault equals or exceeds that of the plaintiff. See id. Defendants can never be jointly and severally liable for noneconomic damages;
their liability is limited solely to their proportional share. See id. The Florida Supreme
Court interpreted this provision to allow apportionment of “proportional shares” among
persons who are not parties to the suit, such as unknown tortfeasors, settlors, or immune
tortfeasors. See Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 1993).
The 1986 Act also imposed a cap of $450,000 on noneconomic damages. See FLA. STAT. §
768.80 (1997). This cap was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court. See Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 1987). Moreover, the 1986 Act limited the amount of punitive damage awards. See FLA. STAT. § 768.7273 (1997). Under the Act, punitive damages in negligence cases are presumed excessive if
they exceeded three times the compensatory damages. See id. Furthermore, 60% of the
punitive damage awards in such cases were to go to the state. See id. § 768.73 (1991). In
1992, the Legislature decreased the state’s share to 35%. See Act effective April 8, 1992,
ch. 92-85, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 821, 821-22 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (1991)). In 1995,
the state share came under sunset review and was not reenacted, thus retiring this provision. See Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 92-85, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 821, 822. The Legislature has considered reenactment of the state share but has not yet reinstated it. See Fla.
SB 708 (1995); Fla. HB 2669 (1995); Fla. SB 822 (1996); Fla. HB 773 (1996).
The 1986 Act allowed courts to order structured payments of future economic losses exceeding $250,000 in negligence cases. See FLA. STAT. § 768.78 (1997). It also required an
offset for payments to an injured person from collateral sources, requiring a reduction of
an award to reflect payment by other sources of medical insurance, disability insurance,
etc. See id. § 768.76. The 1986 provided statutory remittitur and additur provisions that
list specific criteria the court must consider to reduce or increase awards. See id. § 768.74.
Finally, the 1986 Act required all verdicts to be itemized, with a detailed break out of past
and future economic and noneconomic damages. See id. § 768.77.
11. See ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 698.
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sions, an excess insurance profits law, and a mandatory liability insurance rate rollback.12
Within only two years, yet another medical malpractice insurance
“crisis” arose, this time highlighted by obstetricians’ inability to obtain coverage for delivering babies.13 In response, the Legislature
convened in a Special Session and quickly passed the Florida Medical Incident Recovery Act of 1988 (1988 Act). 14 The 1988 Act revisited
many of the provisions enacted in 1985 and 1986, and included five
major reforms, including extensive immunity for providers, presuit
screening requirements, arbitration, caps on damages, and a no-fault
program for infants suffering brain damage at birth.15
After this furious flurry of legislative activity, the general liability
and medical malpractice field remained fairly quiet over the next
decade, marked primarily only by the annual legislative skirmishes
over discrete issues.16 The liability insurance markets stabilized. Day

12. See id. at 695.
13. See FLA. STAT. § 766.301 (1997) (listing an unusual codification of legislative
findings and intent).
14. Ch. 88-1, 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 119 (amending and codified in scattered sections of
FLA. STAT.).
15. See id. The 1988 Act granted greater immunity to health care practitioners when
rendering emergency care. See FLA. STAT. § 768.78 (1997). Liability may only be imposed
when the practitioner breaches a “reckless disregard” standard. See id. The 1988 Act also
imposed strict requirements for presuit investigation and screening of medical malpractice cases. See id. §§ 766.203-.206. These procedures included extensive requirements designed to make it more difficult and expensive to file such lawsuits. See id. Coupled with
severe penalties against attorneys who do not comply with the specific requirements, the
intended effect of these provisions was to virtually eliminate any chance of frivolous or unfounded lawsuits being brought against doctors. See id.
A voluntary binding arbitration provision of medical malpractice claims was also included. See id. §§ 766.207-.212. Furthermore, the arbitration process was tied to caps not
only on noneconomic damages and attorneys’ fees, but also on economic damages. See id.
For example, wage-loss damages were limited to 80% of lost wages and loss of earning capacity. See id.
Moreover, the 1988 Act created the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, a state “no-fault” program designed to provide limited compensation for infants who suffer a brain or spinal cord injury as a result of oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury at birth, and as a result are permanently and substantially mentally and
physically impaired. See id. §§ 766.301-.316. The exclusive remedies under the program
allow reimbursement for medical care and custodial expenses not otherwise covered by insurance or other government programs, and limit any award for emotional and psychological damages to $100,000. See id.
Finally, the Act completely abolished joint and several liability for teaching hospitals
and the Board of Regents. See id. § 766.112.
16. The Legislature’s attention did, however, turn to the workers’ compensation area
after a series of large insurance rate increases. This “workers’ compensation insurance
crisis” prompted the passage of four major revisions. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1989, ch. 89289, 1989 Fla. Laws 1743 (amending and codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.); Act
effective July 1, 1990, ch. 90-201, 1990 Fla. Laws 894 (amending and codified in scattered
sections of FLA. STAT.); Act effective Jan. 24, 1991, ch. 91-1, 1991 Fla. Laws 21 (amending
and codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.); Act effective Jan. 1, 1994, ch. 93-415,
1994 Fla. Laws 62 (amending and codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.). These
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care centers could buy liability insurance, and obstetricians could
once again deliver babies secure in their medical malpractice coverage. For the most part, the changes adopted during this period remain intact today.
III. THE POLITICS, THE PLAYERS, AND THEIR MESSAGES
A. The Politics
In the fall of 1996, a dramatic political change occurred in Florida. For the first time in this century, both houses of the Florida
Legislature came under the control of the Republican party when the
Florida House joined the Senate under Republican leadership. 17 This
change in the political balance was eagerly anticipated by the business community as an opportunity to promote business interests and
to push through pro-business legislation. 18 Specifically, business interests viewed the power change as a chance to revise the tort system, notwithstanding the conspicuous absence of even a hint of the
traditional sine qua non of tort reform—an insurance crisis. Business interests openly showed their intentions with statements such
as, “We think we have a two-year political window.”19
B. The Players and Their Messages
Soon, a coalition of business and health care groups sharing a
common interest in shielding themselves from liability joined forces,
forming the “Tort Reform United Effort” (TRUE). 20 TRUE set out to
assemble its wish list and sell it to the Legislature. It focused its lobbying efforts on convincing legislators that reform was necessary to
protect Florida’s businesses from “deep-pockets lawsuits” and
“frivolous lawsuits and outrageous damage awards.” 21 TRUE’s

changes, which have dramatically transformed the workers’ compensation law, chapter
440, Florida Statutes, are beyond the scope of this Article.
17. See John Kennedy & Michael Griffen, Legislative Power Shifts to Orange,
ORLANDO SENT., Nov. 7, 1996, at A1.
18. See Mary Ellen Klas, Delay Tactics, FLA. TREND, July 1997, at 84-85.
19. Peter Mitchell, In Legislative Races, Tort Reform Becomes (Finally) a Defining Issue, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1996, at F1 (interviewing Bill Herrle of the National Federation
of Independent Business).
20. See Bob Keefe, Talk of Tort Reform Heats Up, ST. PETE. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at
D5. Major participants in TRUE include the Florida Chamber of Commerce, Associated
Industries of Florida, the National Federation of Independent Business, the Florida Retail
Federation, the Florida Medical Association, and the Florida Institute of Certified Public
Accountants. See Memorandum from Tort Reform United Effort to Governor Lawton
Chiles (Sept. 10 1997) (discussing civil justice reform proposals) (on file with author).
21. FLA. CHAMBER OF COM. & TRUE, THEY JUST DON’T GET IT! (1997) (on file with
author).
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claims, of course, provoked a strong response from citizen, consumer,
and lawyer groups.22 The next phase of the tort reform battle began.
IV. THE PROPOSALS
A. The Early Proposals
Senate Bill 1774 was the first comprehensive reform bill to appear on the 1997 legislative scene. Sponsored by Senator John Ostalkiewicz,23 the bill included six major provisions.24 After the initial
22. Major participants included the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, the Coalition
for Family Safety, the Coalition to Protect Florida Elders, the AARP, the Florida Consumer Action Network, the Florida State Council of Senior Citizens, and numerous others. See FLA. H. R. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., APPEARANCE RECORD, PCB FS 97-06 (Apr. 16,
1997) (on file with comm.).
23. Repub., Windermere. Senate Bill 1774 was unveiled at a press conference on
March 6, 1997, at which Senator Ostalkiewicz and Representative Bob Brooks, Repub.,
Winter Park, announced their intention to file the bill. Ultimately, however, Representative Brooks never filed the companion to Senate Bill 1774 in the House. See FLA. LEGIS.,
FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS
at 138, SB 1774.
24. See Fla. SB 1774 (1997). The bill would have allowed the introduction of evidence
of prior similar lawsuits brought by the plaintiff. See id. § 1. It would have allowed the
trier of fact to “consider the plaintiff’s involvement . . . in determining liability.” Id. How
this ambiguous directive was expected to be implemented is unclear.
Further, the bill would have shortened the statute of limitations from four to two years
for tort actions based on negligence or intentional acts, including products liability.See id.
§ 2. It also would have applied this limit to written or unwritten contract actions. See id.
Any suit would have been required to be brought within two years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred, or from the time the facts giving rise to action were
discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. See id. The
existing two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations would not have been affected.
See id.
Moreover, the bill would have reinstated and increased the state share of punitive damage awards to 100%, payable to the State’s Public Education Capital Outlay and Debt
Service Trust Fund for school construction. See id. § 3. Calculation of attorneys’ fees based
on any part of the punitive damage award would have been prohibited. See id.
The bill would have capped noneconomic damages at $250,000, using a broad definition
of noneconomic damages. See id. § 5. This was included despite the fact that the Florida
Supreme Court had already held such caps to be in violation of article I, section 21 of the
Florida Constitution. See Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087-1089 (Fla.
1987). Additionally, the bill would have required that “all civil suits for monetary damages” be referred for nonbinding arbitration. Fla. SB 1774, § 6 (1997). Under the proposed
scheme, if the arbitrator awarded damages to the plaintiff and the plaintiff proceeded with
the lawsuit, then the plaintiff would have to pay the defendant’s legal fees and costs if the
plaintiff recovered less than the arbitrator’s award. See id. Conversely, if the plaintiff recovered damages equal to or greater than the arbitration award, then the defendant
would have to pay the plaintiff’s legal fees and costs. See id.
Finally, the bill provided that Florida’s comparative fault law, codified at section 768.81,
Florida Statutes, would apply to “all civil actions,” not just to specified negligence cases.
Id. § 7. This would have broadened its application by eliminating the current exceptions
for intentional torts, pollution cases, and causes of action for which the application of joint
and several liability is specifically provided by chapters 403 (Environmental Protection),
498 (Land Sales Practices), 517 (Securities Transactions), 542 (Combinations Restricting
Trade or Commerce), and 895 (Racketeering and Illegal Debts). See id. This section of the
bill would have also shifted Florida from a “pure” comparative fault approach to a modi-
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splash of publicity, Senate Bill 1774 faded into obscurity. It was referred to three committees: Senate Judiciary, Senate Banking and
Insurance, and Senate Ways and Means. 25 Ultimately, it died in the
Senate Judiciary Committee at the end of the session without ever
receiving a hearing.26
Shortly after Senate Bill 1774 was unveiled, another tort reform
bill was filed by Senator John McKay.27 Although substantially different in approach from the earlier Ostalkiewicz bill, Senate Bill
2148 shared the theme of liability reduction through seven major
provisions.28 Like its predecessor, Senate Bill 2148 ultimately died at
fied approach in which recovery by a plaintiff would be barred in any situation where the
claimant was more than 50% at fault for the injury. See id. Finally, the bill would have
eliminated all the remaining vestiges of the doctrine of joint and several liability, including in cases where joint and several liability is specifically required by other sections of
the Florida Statutes. See id.
25. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 138, SB 1774.
26. See id.
27. Repub., Bradenton. See Fla. SB 2148 (1997). No House companion was ever filed.
28. See id. The bill would have imposed a 12-year statute of repose in products liability cases with the statute running from the date of delivery of the product to its original
purchaser. See id. § 1. Moreover, to claim punitive damages, a plaintiff would be required
to prove by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable basis for the damages at the time a
claim for punitive damages is filed. See id. § 2. Certiorari review would be immediately
available with regard to both the trial court’s procedure and the sufficiency of the evidence
related to the basis for the punitive damages. See id. No punitive damages would be allowed if the compensatory damages sought were only for economic losses, including those
resulting from fraud in the inducement. See id. The bill would have required that the
question of liability and the amount of punitive damages be tried separately from those
relating to compensatory damages. See id. It would have prohibited the introduction of
evidence relating to punitive damages prior to a determination by the trier of fact that the
defendant was liable for compensatory damages. See id. It would have required the same
trier of fact to try both compensatory and punitive damage issues. See id.
Additionally, the bill would have prohibited awards of punitive damages based solely on
vicarious liability. See id. § 3. Damages could be awarded only against a person who
“knowingly participated in the conduct constituting the aggravating factor providing the
basis for punitive damages.” Id. Officers, directors, or managers of a corporation would
similarly be required to have knowingly participated in or condoned the behavior before
they could be held liable. See id. Also, the bill would have reinstated the state share of
punitive damage awards and increased the state share to 75%, prior to deduction of attorneys’ fees, but after the deduction of other costs of litigation. See id. The proceeds would
go to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund, subject to a 40/35 split between that fund
and a proposed court system funding trust, the Court Article V Trust Fund, if and when
that trust fund came into being. See id.
The bill would have prohibited, except under certain circumstances, a punitive damage
award against a defendant who established before trial that punitive damages had previously been awarded against the defendant in any action in state or federal court alleging
harm from the same act or course of conduct. See id. It would have allowed a subsequent
award of punitive damages based on the same act or course of conduct only if the court determined that the claimant could offer new and substantial evidence of previously discovered, additional wrongdoing on the part of the defendant. See id. Punitive damages
awarded under such circumstances were to be reduced by the sum of all punitive damages
previously awarded against the defendant involving the same act or course of conduct.See
id. Provisions in the current law relating to proration of the state share of settlements,
proration of partial collections of punitive damages, calculation of attorneys’ fees based on
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the end of the session in the Senate Judiciary Committee without
having been heard.29
B. The FAIR Bill: HB 2117
TRUE spokespeople lauded the Ostalkiewicz and McKay bills as
“a good starting point,” but suggested that there was “much more to
come.”30 However, TRUE was having its own internal problems. Although TRUE’s constituent members seemed to have no problem
agreeing among themselves that trial lawyers were the target, internal bickering among the diverse members, each pushing their own
personally self-serving list of “reforms,” frustrated the formation of a
consensus agenda.31 Finally, at almost the latest possible moment in
the session, there appeared in the House the proposed Florida Accountability and Individual Responsibility Liability Act (FAIR). 32
Unlike the two earlier bills, this bill sprang forth with a head of
steam as a proposed committee bill from the House Committee on
Financial Services. After a display of legislative theatrics, the
Committee voted the bill out of committee, and it was subsequently
introduced as House Bill 2117 under the sponsorship of the committee and its Chairman, Representative R. Z. “Sandy” Safley. 33 It thus

punitive damages, and the prohibition against informing the jury of the provisions of the
section would all have been repealed. See id.
The bill would have extended the current statutory itemized verdict provisions in two
ways. Compare id. § 4, with FLA. STAT. § 768.77 (1997). First, it would have applied the
itemized verdict provisions to all civil actions, instead of just to negligence actions. See
Fla. SB 2148 (1997). Second, it would have applied structured judgment provisions to
awards of noneconomic damages in cases in which the trier of fact makes an award of future noneconomic losses in excess of $100,000, rather than just to economic damages in
cases involving economic losses in excess of $250,000. See id. § 5. Further, it would have
provided for the structuring of all judgments of economic and noneconomic damages at the
request of either party, and eliminated the ability of the court to deny the request where
manifest injustice would result to any party. See id. In the situation where a claimant dies
prior to the termination of a structured award of noneconomic damages, the bill would
terminate the liability of the defendant for any future payments. See id. The bill also
would have imposed similar proration and periodic payment requirements on attorneys’
fees that are based on a structured award. See id. Termination of the defendant’s liability
for payment of remaining attorneys’ fees would occur upon the death of the plaintiff, even
though these fees may in part be based upon economic damages that would still be payable in a lump sum to the estate of the plaintiff. See id.
Finally, the bill would have repealed section 768.81(5), Florida Statutes, which provides
for the application of joint and several liability to cases under $25,000. See id. § 6.
29. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, at 160, SB 2148.
30. Lisa Gibbs, Tort Reform’s First Salvos, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., Mar. 31, 1997,
at A1.
31. See Klas, supra note 18, at 85-86.
32. See Fla. HB 2117 (1997).
33. Repub., Clearwater.
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attained the significance of being the only bill of the three reform
packages to have made it out of committee.34
House Bill 2117 included some of the same concepts addressed in
the earlier Senate bills and added some new twists of its own. The
bill first recited a number of legislative “findings,” including that
“there is an overpowering public necessity to eliminate perpetual liability for defective products because such perpetual liability places
34. Although the Legislature is often criticized for acting slowly, the steps by which
this bill came to be introduced in a race against the legislative clock is a revealing example of how issues can be “fast-tracked,” albeit at the cost of short cuts and outright irregularities in the process. April 25 was the last day for consideration of bills on second reading. See FLA. H.R. RULE 137 (1996). The bill had to make it to the floor by that date to be
considered for a final vote during the last week of the session. See id. The first version of
the bill was unveiled on April 10, 1997, as the House Financial Services Committee Proposed Committee Bill 6. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., PCB 97-06 (draft of Apr. 10.
1997). Interestingly, this committee has jurisdiction over insurance and banking matters,
not the civil justice system; the civil justice system falls under the jurisdiction of the
House Civil Justice and Claims Committee. On April 15, the Proposed Committee Bill was
noticed for consideration by the Financial Services Committee on April 16. See Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., Notice of Committee Meeting (Apr. 15, 1997). Three hours before
the hearing, a proposed amendment was revealed that would strike everything after the
enacting clause and insert all new language. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., PCB 9706-1bb-bi (draft of Apr. 15, 1997). At the hearing on April 16, Chairman Safley took approximately three hours of public testimony, but then allowed committee members only
one minute per side to debate the bill. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., tape recording
of proceedings (Apr. 16, 1997) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Financial Services Hearing]. The amendment was adopted and the bill was voted favorably. See Fla. H.R. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., Committee Bill Action Worksheet PCB FS 97-06 (Apr. 16, 1997) (on file
with comm.). Representative John Rayson, Repub., Pompano Beach, made a motion to reconsider the vote by which the bill passed and leave the matter pending, which would require the bill to be carried over to another committee meeting pursuant to Florida House
Rule 60. See Financial Services Hearing, supra. Immediately, another member made a
Motion to Rise. Chairman Safley ruled that the motion to rise superseded the motion to
reconsider and, thus, the motion to reconsider was not valid. See id. Representative Rayson protested Chairman Safley’s ruling and appealed to the Speaker, who, upon a review
of the meeting tapes, agreed that Rayson’s motion to reconsider was valid. As a result, the
bill was returned to the Financial Services Committee. On April 24, the House Financial
Services met at a specially called meeting during the noon break in the House Floor Session to take up the motion to reconsider. See FLA. H. JOUR. 703 (Reg. Sess. 1997) (motion
to allow special leave to meet); Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Notice of Committee
Meeting (filed Apr. 23, 1997). Representative Earl Ziebarth, Repub., Deland, asked to debate the Motion to Reconsider, but Chairman Safley refused, ruling that the motion was
non-debatable (contrary to Florida House Rule 145). See Financial Services Hearing, supra. A vote was taken, the motion to reconsider failed, and the bill was reported out favorably. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Committee Bill Action Worksheet PCB FS
97-06 (Apr. 24, 1997) (on file with comm.). Later the same day, the bill was introduced as
House Bill 2117 and read the first time by publication in the House Journal. See FLA. H.R.
JOUR. 876 (Reg. Sess. 1997). Subsequently, the bill was not referred to the Civil Justice
and Claims Committee (the committee with substantive jurisdiction over the areas addressed by the bill) as would have been the normal practice for a bill affecting this area of
the law, or to the House Economic Impact Council as required by Florida House Rule
46(a). See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 332-33, HB 2117. Interestingly, as one of the last items of
business during the 1997 Regular Session, the Speaker ruled that the motion to reconsider was debatable, contrary to the Financial Services Committee Chairman Safley’s
Ruling. See FLA. H. JOUR. 2189 (Reg. Sess. 1997).
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an undue burden on manufacturers, increases costs to consumers,
and unreasonably restricts economic growth.” 35 The bill set forth
nine propositions.36
First, like Senate Bill 2148, House Bill 2117 would impose a
twelve-year statute of repose in products liability cases. 37 However,
under House Bill 2117, the statute would run from the date the
product leaves the possession and control of the manufacturer rather
than the date it was delivered to its original purchaser.38
Second, the bill would substantially dilute Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine.39 Unlike either Senate Bill 1774 or Senate
Bill 2148, the bill would limit the vicarious liability of an owner of
any type of personal property for an injury caused by another person’s use of the property when the property owner has liability insurance coverage of no less than $100,000 per person or $300,000 per
incident for bodily injury, and no less than $50,000 for property
damage, or umbrella coverage of $500,000.40 Notwithstanding
whether or not the owner had this insurance, the owner would also
have no duty whatsoever to warn a user of the property of defects in
the property which are unknown to the owner or which are known,
or should be known, to an ordinary user of the property. 41 Thus, this
draft has very negative consequences. The bill would not encourage
an owner to look for defects in his property that could harm another
person, and even worse, would provide no incentive to warn of known
hazards. Furthermore, the way this provision is actually drafted, it
deems the owner of the property not to be the legal owner, thus effectively eliminating the body of law relating to negligent entrustment.42

35. Fla. HB 2117, Preamble (1997).
36. See id. The following discussion refers to the bill as passed with the “strike everything” amendment, not the provisions of the original Proposed Committee Bill 6.
37. See Fla. HB 2117, § 2 (1997). Current Florida law provides for a four-year statute
of limitation and no statute of repose in products liability cases. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11
(1997).
38. See Fla. HB 2117, § 2 (1997).
39. See id. § 3. This provision would change the long-standing Florida law applicable
to owners of dangerous devices, including motor vehicles. Under this principle, where the
“agency or appliance . . . was ‘dangerous in itself,’ or liable to inflict serious injury to others, when operated in the customary method of use . . . public safety demands that [the
owner] shall be answerable for the exercise of his servant’s judgment.” Southern Cotton
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 725, 86 So. 629, 634 (1920) (quoting Barmore v. Vicksburg, S
& P Ry. Co., 38 So. 210 (Miss. 1905)).
40. See Fla. HB 2117, § 3 (1997). The curious use of insurance limits here betrays the
real purpose of this provision—to immunize rental car companies from vicarious liability
under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. A similar statutory scheme was adopted
for long-term car leasing situations in 1986. See FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b) (1997).
41. See Fla. HB 2117, § 3 (1997).
42. See id.
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Third, House Bill 2117 would create new defenses to personal injury and property damage claims.43 Under this provision, a defendant would not be liable to an injured plaintiff if the plaintiff was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol to the extent that the plaintiff’s faculties were impaired, or the plaintiff had a blood or breath
alcohol level of 0.08 % or more, and the plaintiff was more than 50%
at fault for the injury.44 Additionally, any person who enters the
property of another without actual consent, commits a crime against
a person or property of another, or enters the property of another
while intoxicated or under the influence of an illegal drug, would not
be able to recover for injury to person or property unless he or she
could prove by clear and convincing evidence that his or her culpability was less than the person from whom recovery was sought. 45
Among this provision’s deleterious effects, the imposition of the
higher standard of proof—clear and convincing rather than preponderance of the evidence—forces the injured person to leap a high
hurdle to prove the defendant’s fault.46 Another problem with this
provision is its broad application—it does not just apply to trespassers, criminals, and substance-impaired people, but it also applies to
anyone who enters a premise without “actual consent,” such as a
child who visits a friend.47
Fourth, House Bill 2117 would prohibit the imposition of vicarious liability against a defendant for any harm caused by an intentional tort committed by a third party.48
Fifth, the bill would change the standards for liability and the
procedure for pleading punitive damage claims. 49 The burden required for pleading punitive damages would increase from a reasonable showing to clear and convincing evidence of a reasonable basis
for recovery of the damages.50 Immediate certiorari review of both
the procedure and the sufficiency of the evidence would be avail43. See id. § 4.
44. See id. In essence, this would impose a 51% modified comparative fault scheme
instead of pure comparative fault when drugs or alcohol are involved; i.e., if the impaired
plaintiff is 51% or more at fault for the injury, he or she receives no award.
45. See id. § 4. This would similarly impose a modification to the current rule of pure
comparative fault in the form of a “more than” rule; that is, the injured plaintiff could recover only when the defendant’s fault was equal to or more than that of the plaintiff’s.
Note that the bill produces an absurd result in the situation where one substanceimpaired person injures another substance-impaired person.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. § 5. This appears to be intended to abrogate the doctrine of respondeat superior to immunize an employer in situations where an employee commits an intentional
tort against a third party. Groups representing senior citizen interests noted that this
provision would shield a nursing home from liability for any act of abuse committed by an
attendant against a resident.
49. See id. § 6.
50. Compare id. with FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (1997).
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able.51 Punitive damages would be disallowed in cases involving only
economic damages, except in cases of fraud. 52 Liability for punitive
damages would require a finding based upon clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant was guilty of “intentional misconduct,”
defined as meaning that the defendant “had actual knowledge of the
wrongfulness of its conduct and the high probability that injury to
the claimant would result and, despite that knowledge, intentionally
pursued that course of conduct, resulting in personal injury.” 53 Upon
motion by the defendant, punitive damages would have to be tried
separately from compensatory damages, but by the same trier of
fact.54 Evidence relating solely to punitive damages would not be
admissible until after the trier of fact determined that the defendant
was liable for more than nominal compensatory damages and computed the amount of compensatory damages.55
Sixth, the bill would extend the current punitive damages cap to
three times the amount of compensatory damages for all civil actions, except contract actions.56 Thus, by precluding contract actions,
it appears the drafters may be seeking to remove the “three-times”
cap when business sues over business practices. 57 The state share of
punitive damage awards would be reinstated and increased to 75%
of the award after deduction of attorneys’ fees and costs. 58 Punitive
damage awards would be allowed against a person based on vicarious liability only if “[t]he person intentionally participated in the intentional misconduct or, in the case of a corporation, the officers, directors, or managers of the corporation intentionally participated in
or intentionally condoned the intentional misconduct.”59
Seventh, the bill would also limit subsequent punitive damages
awards against an entity.60 Under House Bill 2117, a defendant

51. See Fla. HB 2117, § 6 (1997).
52. See id.
53. Id. Thus, not only would the required burden of proof be increased, but conduct
must be more heinous before punitive damages could be awarded. Current law allows
punitive damages for “willful, wanton, or gross misconduct.” FLA. STAT. § 768.73(1)(a)
(1997).
54. See Fla. HB 2117, § 6 (1997).
55. See id.
56. See id. § 7.
57. Under current law, the limit applies to civil actions based on “negligence, strict
liability, products liability, misconduct in commercial transactions, professional liability,
or breach of warranty.” FLA. STAT. § 768.73(1)(a) (1997). As drafted, the proposal appears
intended to eliminate the “three-times” limit for contract actions, and would thus enlarge
the availability of punitive damages in the area of misconduct in commercial transactions.
See Fla. HB 2117, § 7 (1997).
58. See Fla. HB 2117, § 7 (1997).
59. Id.
60. See id.; cf., W.R. Grace & Co.—Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 506 (Fla. 1994)
(holding that a defendant can be subject to repeated awards of punitive damages based on
the same conduct).
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would have the ability to limit exposure to punitive damages by establishing before trial that “punitive damages had previously been
awarded against that defendant in any state or federal court in
[Florida] . . . alleging harm from the same act or course of conduct.” 61
This concept is defined for purposes of a product liability action as
“acts resulting in substantially the same manufacturing defects, acts
resulting in substantially the same defects in design, or failure to
warn of substantially the same hazards, with respect to substantially similar units of a product.”62 A plaintiff would be able to overcome this protective shield only by a showing of clear and convincing
evidence that “the amount of prior punitive damages awarded was
totally insufficient to punish that defendant’s behavior.” 63 Even if
successful in meeting that burden, the plaintiff’s punitive damage
award would then be reduced by the amount of all the earlier punitive damage awards.64
Eighth, like Senate Bill 2148, the bill would eliminate the current
exception allowing application of the doctrine of joint and several liability in cases where the total damages are less than $25,000.65
Finally, the bill would create a civil cause of action against convicted drug dealers for damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees incurred
by a plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s illegal actions. 66 Damages
would also be recoverable from the parent of a minor who is liable for
the damages.67
Ultimately, House Bill 2117 was not moved to the House Floor for
a vote, in all likelihood because the Senate President, Toni Jennings,68 sent signals that it would not be taken up in the Senate
during the 1997 session.69 After the session, both the merits of the
FAIR Bill and the questionable attempt by the business community
to pass it in the closing days of the session brought media criticism.
The Miami Herald called it “A Too-Rushed Reform” 70 and the St. Pe61. Fla. HB 2117, § 7 (1997).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id. § 8.
66. See id. § 9. This concept originally surfaced in separate bills in both the House
and the Senate. See HB 557 (1997) (Rep. Merchant); SB 474 (1997) (Sen. Gutman); SB 764
(1997) (Sen. Crist); and SB 1208 (1997) (Sen. Lee). Senate Bill 764 and Senate Bill 474
were combined by the Senate Judiciary into a committee substitute that eventually
passed both houses and was signed into law by the Governor. See Act effective May 23,
1997, ch. 97-80, 1997 Fla. Laws 477, 477 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 772.12 (1997)). This
provision was probably viewed as one that would be politically damaging to vote against,
and thus was added to House Bill 2117 to increase that bill’s chances of passage.
67. See HB 2117, § 9 (1997).
68. Repub., Orlando.
69. See Lucy Morgan, Lawsuit Limiting Bill Lives, For Now, ST. PETE. TIMES, Apr.
25, 1997, at E1.
70. Editorial, A Too-Rushed Reform, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 29, 1997, at A6.
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tersburg Times opined that “[f]or most residents, ‘FAIR’ might not
be.”71
When the 1997 session ended with House Bill 2117 still on the
House calendar, the bill did not fade away. Under a major change to
the House Rules adopted in 1997, House bills now have a two-year
life.72 Thus, House Bill 2117 did not actually die at the close of the
1997 session. When the 1998 session begins, House Bill 2117 will be
right where it was, on the calendar, ready for referral to the House
Civil Justice and Claims Committee, to the House Economic Impact
Council, or directly to the floor for action.
V. POST-SESSION ACTIVITIES
The tort reform movement did not disappear upon adjournment
sine die of the 1997 session.73 In anticipation of the 1998 session,
several things are happening. In the closing hours of the 1997 session, when it began to be clear that House Bill 2117 was not going
anywhere, representatives from TRUE and the Academy of Florida
Trial Lawyers were requested by the Speaker of the House, Dan
Webster,74 and other House leaders to form a working group. 75 This
group is to examine whether some common ground can be reached
between the two groups on the issues.76 The groups were given a
mandate to come back with a plan or be faced with the return of
House Bill 2117 or another set of reforms, 77 a threat clearly aimed
more at the trial lawyers than the business community.
At the same time, the House Civil Justice and Claims Committee,
which ironically was not involved with House Bill 2117, planned to
hold an extensive series of committee hearings on “Small Business
and the Tort System in Florida” during the fall and winter of 1997. 78
From the schedule of meetings and topics, it appears this ambitious
project is designed to educate committee members on virtually the
entire tort system as it may affect small businesses in Florida.79

71. Martin Dyckman, For Most Residents, “FAIR” Might Not Be, ST. PETE. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1997, at D3.
72. See FLA. H.R. RULE 96 (1996-98).
73. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that House Bill 2117 includes all of the items
on the tort reform agenda. Conspicuously absent, for example, is a medical malpractice
component. See HB 2117 (1997).
74. Repub., Ocoee.
75. See Klas, supra note 18, at 85-86.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See Letter from Representative Tom Warner, Chairman, Florida House of Representatives Committee on Civil Justice & Claims, to Representative Dan Webster, Speaker,
Florida House of Representatives (June 24, 1997) (on file with comm.).
79. The main topics covered during the course of the eight tentatively scheduled
meetings were: The Tort System; Liability and Fault; Defenses and Limitations; Compen-
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Reports indicated that Senate President Toni Jennings was considering the creation of a select committee to examine the tort system,80 but as of the end of the 1997 session no action was taken. Reportedly, Senate President Jennings was still not convinced of the
need for tort reform.81 In mid-August, however, citing concerns
raised by the business community, she appointed the Senate Select
Committee on Litigation Reform to consider “whether our civil litigation system is, in fact, limiting Florida’s economic development potential.”82 The stated goals of the Select Committee are to “separate
perception from reality, . . . create a friendlier business climate, . . .
[and] provide an open forum for review of the civil justice system.” 83
To this end, the Select Committee was charged with the following
mission:
The select committee shall conduct hearings to assess the manner
and extent to which the current civil litigation environment is affecting economic development and job-creation efforts in the state.
The select committee shall ascertain what civil litigation reforms,
if any, would enhance the economic development climate of the
state while continuing to preserve the rights of citizens to seek redress through the courts.84

The jurisdiction of the new Select Committee will include all of the
major elements of the civil litigation system, 85 but it is not to delve
into the areas of workers’ compensation or medical malpractice. 86 It
held hearings during the fall and winter of 1997, and will report its
findings and recommendations back to the Senate by January 20,
1998.87
As yet, the Governor has not become actively involved in this fray.
As pointed out by the Governor’s Chief of Staff, Linda Loomis Shelley, “This is not an issue that people talk to the governor about as he
travels the state nor is it an issue people raise when he tries to recruit businesses to come to Florida.”88
sation and Damages; Civil Litigation; Frivolous Suits or Defenses; and Streamlining and
Alternative Dispute Resolution. See id.
80. See De’Ann Weimer, Lawmaker Offers Plan to Curb Suits, Big Injury Awards,
PALM BCH. POST, Mar. 17, 1997, at D1.
81. See Klas, supra note 18, at 86.
82. OFFICE OF THE FLA. S. PRES., PRESIDENT TONI JENNINGS ANNOUNCES THE
CREATION OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON LITIGATION REFORM 2 (1997) (on file with
author).
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id. at 2.
85. See id. at 3 (including joint and several liability, statutes of limitations, noneconomic damages, evidence, vicarious liability, comparative fault, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and non-binding arbitration).
86. See id. at 2.
87. See id. at 4.
88. Klas, supra note 18, at 86.
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VI. THE FACTS: IS THERE A NEED FOR REFORM?
A. The Amount of Litigation in Florida
The proponents of tort reform have tried to create the impression
that we are in the midst of a tort litigation explosion. Statistics
compiled by the Florida Office of the State Courts Administrator
quickly and empirically dispel this notion. The statistics speak for
themselves—civil case filings have remained remarkably stable over
the last ten years and negligence actions have remained but a tiny
proportion of the caseload of Florida’s courts.89
In 1996, civil cases accounted for 57% of the total cases filed;
criminal and juvenile cases made up the other 43%. 90 These relative
percentages have remained constant for at least the last three
years.91 Last year, professional malpractice cases represented only
0.4% of all civil cases filed, products liability cases 0.5%, auto negligence cases 4.6%, and all other negligence cases 2.9%. 92 Domestic
relations and probate cases accounted for 70% of all civil cases.93
On the other hand, in 1996, there were over twenty times as many
mortgage foreclosure cases and over ten times as many contractual
indebtedness cases as there were products liability cases in Florida. 94
In fact, mortgage foreclosures and contractual indebtedness cases
accounted for twice as many cases as all the types of negligence cases
combined.95
The proportion of negligence cases has remained remarkably constant relative to other types of civil cases.96 In 1986, negligence cases
comprised 8.9% of the total civil cases filed in Florida; in 1996, they
89. See KENNETH D. KRANZ, ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA CASE FILINGS: 1986-1996 1 (1997)
(on file with author) (consisting of information from ALEAN MILLER, OFFICE OF THE STATE
COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, FLORIDA SUPREME COURT SUMMARY REPORTING SYSTEM REPORTS
(1986-1996)).
90. See id. at 2. Civil cases include domestic relations, probate, negligence, condominium, contractual indebtedness, mortgage foreclosure, eminent domain, and other miscellaneous civil matters. For purposes of this analysis, cases other than civil cases include
criminal cases and juvenile cases (which include delinquency and dependency cases). Data
was not available from the Office of the State Courts Administrator for criminal case filings. See Letter from Alean Miller, Court Statistic Consultant, Office of the State Courts
Administrator, to Lynn McCartney, Assistant Director for Legislative Affairs of the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers (Sept. 5, 1997) (on file with author). Criminal case data used
for 1994 through 1996 was obtained from the Justice Council, Florida House of Representatives. See HOUSE JUSTICE COUNCIL, 1997 POST-SESSION RESOURCE BOOK 53-56 (1997).
91. See KRANZ, supra note 89, at 2.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See ALEAN MILLER, OFF. OF THE ST. CTS. ADMINISTRATOR, FLORIDA SUPREME
COURT SUMMARY REPORTING SYSTEM REPORT: STATEWIDE SUMMARY 1/96 THROUGH 12/96 §
II-B (1997).
95. See id. Negligence cases include professional malpractice, products liability, auto
negligence, and other negligence.
96. See KRANZ, supra note 89, at 2.
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accounted for 8.3%.97 Domestic relations cases have consistently accounted for about 50% of all civil cases, while probate cases have accounted for almost 20%.98
Although the number of cases filed has increased over the years,
case filings have kept pace with the increase in Florida’s population.99 Civil case filings peaked in 1990, but for the last four years
they have been at the same level as they were in 1986-1987. 100 In
contrast, the number of negligence cases filed has slightly decreased
over time.101 In the ten years between 1986 and 1996, there was more
than an 8% decline in the number of negligence cases filed per capita
in Florida.102
Nationwide, statistics collected by the U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs, and the National Center for State Courts
dispel the myth of any kind tort explosion. Tort litigation has been
stable since 1986,103 and in relative decline since 1990.104 The National Center for State Courts sums the national situation up succinctly: “The bottom line is there is no evidence of an ‘explosion’ in
the volume of tort filings.”105
B. Punitive Damages
Big business loves to complain about punitive damages, but the
numbers hardly show that things are “out of hand” in Florida, at
least when it comes to negligence cases. Since 1986, punitive damages in negligence cases have been capped at three times compensatory damages except in very exceptional circumstances. 106 During the
period from July 1, 1986, to July 1, 1995, the Florida Comptroller’s
Office kept records of punitive damage awards and collections resulting from negligence cases.107 While this data does not necessarily re97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 1.
See id.
See id. at 4.
See STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992; TORT CASES IN LARGE
COUNTIES 2 (1995).
104. See COURT STAT. PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1994: A
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT i (1995) (a joint project of
the Conference of State Court Administrators, the State Justice Institute, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, and the National Center for State Courts’ Court Statistics Project).
105. BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
1995: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 26 (1996).
106. See FLA. STAT. § 768.73(1)(a) (1997). Negligence cases include civil actions based
on negligence, strict liability, products liability, misconduct in commercial transactions,
professional liability, or breach of warranty. See id.
107. See HOUSE JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 90, at 58. Records were kept as a result
of the requirement that the state take a share of all punitive damage awards during this
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flect all punitive damage awards because there is no information
from cases other than negligence cases, they provide some indication
of the low level of activity in Florida.
During this nine-year period, 177 cases were reported as involving punitive damage awards out of a total of approximately 350,000
tort cases disposed of during the same period. 108 Put another way,
punitive damages were awarded in only one case out of each 1723
negligence cases disposed of from 1986 to 1995. The state received
payment toward its share of punitive damages in only 64 of the 177
cases (36.2%).109 The remaining 113 (63.8%) were either uncollectible
or are still to be collected.110 Since the state took a pro rata share of
partially collectible awards, it can be assumed that in 36.2% of the
cases overall, there was some, but not necessarily all, of the award
collected.
Total collections by the state averaged less than $975,000 per
year.111 Based on this number, it can be roughly estimated that total
awards that should have gone to the state averaged approximately
$1.9 million per year.112 Overall, collection of punitive damage
awards thus amounted to only 13.2 cents of each dollar awarded. 113
Cases other than asbestos products liability cases accounted for only
29% of the total amount collected.114
Similarly, national studies show that punitive damages are infrequently awarded. For example, one survey found that juries awarded
period of time. See FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (1995). The state share was 60% from July 1, 1986,
to April 7, 1992, and 35% from April 8, 1992 to July 1, 1995. The Florida Standard Jury
Instructions offer some insight into the types of conduct that warrant awards of punitive
damages:
(1) the conduct causing . . . [the injury] to the claimant was so gross and flagrant as to show a reckless disregard of human life or of the safety of the person exposed to the effects of such conduct; or (2) the conduct showed such an
entire lack of care that the defendant must have been consciously indifferent
to the consequences; or (3) the conduct showed such an entire lack of care that
the defendant must have wantonly or recklessly disregarded the safety and
welfare of the public; or (4) the conduct showed such reckless indifference to
the rights of others as to be equivalent to an intentional violation of those
rights.
Florida Standard Jury Instruction in Civil Cases § PD(a)(2) (1997).
108. See HOUSE JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 90, at 58. Of these 350,000 tort cases,
305,106 involved negligence. See KRANZ, supra note 89, at 1.
109. See HOUSE JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 90, at 58.
110. See id.
111. See id. (finding that the state collected $8,771,006 in punitive damage awards
over nine years).
112. This calculation of $1.9 million is a very rough calculation because it necessarily
assumes an even distribution of awards over time. The state share is based upon 60% of
awards for the first six years and 35% for the last three years. At this point, the actual
distribution of awards over time is not definitively known.
113. See HOUSE JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 90, at 58 (based on total reported
awards of $129.9 million for the nine-year period).
114. See id.
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punitive damages to plaintiffs in only 4% of tort cases. 115 Of the total
punitive damages awarded in all jury cases in a nationwide survey,
only 34.1% were awarded in tort cases.116 The vast majority of punitive damages were awarded in contract disputes and real property
cases.117
One particularly startling finding in another study is that between 1965 and mid-1995, the total number of punitive damage
awards in product liability cases nationwide was only 379, fewer
than thirteen cases per year including all the asbestos cases.118 In
most of these cases, the defendant made a clear calculation that it
would be more profitable to sell a product with a known safety flaw
and pay liability costs than to fix the hazard and sell a safe product.119 Most of the cases involved catastrophic injuries or death, and
70% of the cases involved corporate failure to warn about a known
product danger.120
A recent study looked at punitive damage awards in financial
injury cases, such as disputes arising from insurance or employment
contracts or from unfair business damages. 121 Researchers found that
these cases accounted for almost half of all punitive damage
awards.122 They further found that punitive damages are awarded in
these cases at a rate more than three times that for civil cases
overall.123 Moreover, punitive damages accounted for more than half
of all the damages awarded in financial injury cases.124
C. Florida’s Business Climate
The only evidence suggesting that Florida’s civil justice system is
a hindrance to existing or new businesses comes from self-serving
polls and surveys conducted of businesses by business interests for

115. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992; CIVIL JURY
CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 8, tbl. 8 (1995).
116. See id. (finding that of the total amount of $267,879,000 awarded in punitive
damages for all jury cases, only $91,477,000 were awarded in tort cases).
117. See id.
118. See RALPH NADAR & WESLEY J. SMITH, NO CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND
THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 281 (1996) (citing a study by Professors Michael
Rustad and Thomas Koenig). The data was updated subsequently and presented in testimony to Congress in May 1995. See id. n.74.
119. See id. at 281.
120. See id. at 280-81.
121. See Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Punitive Damage Awards in Financial Injury
Jury Verdicts (visited Sept. 16, 1997) <http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB9028>.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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the sole purpose of promoting the business tort reform agenda. 125 Information from other sources paints a somewhat different picture.
The state’s official keeper of labor market statistics recently said:
Florida’s nonagricultural employment growth rate of 3.9 percent
was faster than the U.S. rate of 2.1 percent over the past year. . . .
Compared to the ten most populous states, Florida created the
second greatest number of jobs over the year and had the fastest
job growth rate. . . . California is the only state to create more jobs
than Florida over the year. However, California has more than
twice the population base of Florida.126

The Miami Herald reported: “[Florida] is leading the nation in job
creation, for instance. The number of jobs in the state has grown 3.9
percent annually for the last four years, or roughly double the national figure. There are 800,000 more jobs in Florida than in 1992.” 127
Florida Trend’s annual supplement, TopRank Florida 1997 , published the Top 10 Things to Know About Florida , which paints an excellent picture of Florida’s economy and portrays Florida as a great
place to do business.128 The Wall Street Journal reported that, “[a]
survey by the National Association of Business Brokers shows that
interest in buying businesses in the state is at an all-time high.”129
Florida is far and away the national leader in new business incorporations, with 86,037 in 1992 and 88,048 in 1993. 130 This is more
than double the number for California (36,973 and 40,072), and
Texas (34,011 and 34,907).131 Florida’s “Gross State Product” grew at
the torrid annual pace of 7% from 1986 to 1992. 132 This is the eighth
highest rate in the country, and well above the national average of
5.9%.133 Job growth increased at a 2.4% annual clip between 1986
and 1995, ranking Florida twelfth and well above the national aver-

125. See, e.g., MASON DIXON & HANK FISHKIND, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEBUSINESS SURVEY OF FLORIDA BUSINESS (1997) (presented at the FAIR Press
Conference on April 15, 1997). The survey polled Florida small business owners and executives about their views on the tort system after they had been bombarded with TRUE
propaganda for months.
126. FLORIDA DEP’T OF LAB. AND EMPLOY. SEC. & BUREAU OF LAB. MKT. INFO.,
FLORIDA LABOR MARKET TRENDS 3 (1997).
127. Gregg Fields, Booming Economy Buoys Clinton’s Florida Campaign, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 16, 1996, at A1.
128. See Top 10 Things to Know about Florida , TOPRANK, 1997, at 170.
129. Jacquline Bueno, All I Want for Christmas is a Business in Florida, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 4, 1996, at F2.
130. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996
543 tbl. 844 (1996).
131. See id.
132. See KENNETH D. KRANZ, ANALYSIS OF GROSS STATE PRODUCTION, JOB GROWTH,
PAYROLL, AND POPULATION (1997) (based on information obtained from the U.S. Dep’t of
Com., Bureau of Economic Analysis) (on file with author).
133. See id.
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age of 1.8% annual growth.134 In all, there were more than 1.5 million
new jobs created in Florida since 1986.135 Payroll (total aggregate
wages) grew at a respectable 6.6% per year,136 ranking Florida tenth
and above the national average of 5.5%.137
These statistics do not show a state in economic trouble. Nevertheless, TRUE contends that Florida’s economy could be improved by
reforming Florida’s tort system. In support, they have presented an
unpublished study that attempts to use an econometric model to relate the influence of legal reforms both to productivity (measured by
output per worker) and to employment.138
Even taking this study at face value without questioning the validity and reliability of the authors’ assumptions, methodology, and
data, and thus their results and conclusions, it cannot rationally be
used to justify further tort reform in Florida. For example, one major
flaw that limits its usefulness as a basis for setting policy is that it
looks only at monetary issues.139 Even the authors acknowledged
that their analysis does not take into account any social or human
factors, or “issues of fairness and justice.” 140 They also acknowledged
the need for liability and stated that “[w]ithout liability and a means
to enforce it, economies lack efficient incentives, predictability and
fairness.”141
Because the study makes no evaluation of the impact of one reform versus another, the study cannot be used to justify enactment
of a specific reform. Similarly, it cannot be used to justify the revision of a reform previously enacted; for example, a lower cap on punitive damages or elimination of the limited applicability of joint and
several liability. In fact, regarding revisions of existing law, it seems
that a more plausible argument is that, for purposes of the effects
demonstrated by the study, Florida has already benefited from these
reforms.
The bottom line, however, is that Florida has already adopted all
of the tested liability-reducing reforms,142 although a general cap on

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See THOMAS J. CAMPBELL ET AL., LIABILITY REFORMS’ CAUSES AND ECONOMIC
IMPACTS (1994). The study also attempts to relate differing state characteristics to the
probability that a state will adopt liability reforms. This aspect of the study will not be
discussed here.
139. See id. at 38-39.
140. Id. at 39.
141. Id. at 11.
142. See FLA. STAT. § 768.73(1)(a) (1997) (limiting punitive damages in certain cases);
id. § 768.74 (providing for a remittitur and additur); id. § 768.77 (providing for itemized
verdicts); id. § 768.81 (comparative fault).
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noneconomic damages was declared unconstitutional. 143 It has
adopted one of the two tested liability-increasing reforms—
comparative negligence.144 Florida would thus seem to have already
implemented the “portfolio of reforms” necessary to achieve a
“consistent impact” on the state’s economy.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite all of the fanfare regarding the alleged need for tort reform in Florida, there is no liability insurance crisis. 145 Nor has there
been an increase in tort cases.146 Systems already exist to control
frivolous lawsuits, damage awards, and attorneys’ fees. 147 Florida’s
economy is booming, and big business itself is the primary source of
many problems in the civil justice system.148 Without empirical evidence justifying a need for reform, big business, including the tobacco industry, has embarked on a massive propaganda campaign
designed to set the stage to “strip away many of the fundamental
protections provided to Florida’s families by the civil justice system.”149 Big business is trying to manipulate the system to “shield
those who injure others with the products they sell,” to make “access
to our courts harder for Florida’s citizens with serious injuries,” and,
as a result, is endangering “the safety of Florida’s families and . . .
[leaving] Florida’s citizens and small businesses at the mercy of
large corporations.”150
The comprehensive liability-reducing tort reform proposals set
forth during the 1997 session are the most far-reaching since the
massive tort reform efforts of the mid-1980s. The battle line has been
drawn. On one side, business is contending that it needs tort reform
in the form of liability reduction to bolster Florida’s economy. On the
other side, citizens, consumers, and trial lawyers are contending that
there is no evidence, economic or otherwise, supporting a need for
these types of proposals, and that big business is opportunistically
trying to shield itself from liability for its wrongful acts at the expense of the safety of Florida’s citizens.
The 1997 session saw the opening skirmishes of a war in which
the stakes are enormous, both politically and for the future of Florida’s citizens. The battles that will decide Florida’s future will most
143. See Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 1987).
144. See id. § 768.81.
145. See Keefe, supra note 20, at D5 (interviewing Scott Carruthers of the Academy of
Florida Trial Lawyers).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. ACADEMY OF FLORIDA TRIAL LAWYERS, IN THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH i (1997) (on file
with author).
150. Id.
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likely be fought in 1998. Hopefully, the Florida Legislature will not
forsake the long-term protection afforded to Florida’s citizens by a
strong civil justice system for a short-term economic gain to selected
Florida businesses.

